News-Specific Price Discovery in Credit Default Swap Markets by Marsh, I. W. & Wagner, W.
Marsh, I. W. & Wagner, W. (2016). News-Specific Price Discovery in Credit Default Swap Markets. 
Financial Management, 45(2), pp. 315-340. doi: 10.1111/fima.12095 
City Research Online
Original citation: Marsh, I. W. & Wagner, W. (2016). News-Specific Price Discovery in Credit 
Default Swap Markets. Financial Management, 45(2), pp. 315-340. doi: 10.1111/fima.12095 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/15692/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
22 
 
 
 
 
 
Why is Price Discovery in Credit Default Swap Markets News-
Specific?  
 
Ian W. Marsh   Wolf Wagner2 
Cass Business School   Tilburg University  
 
 
 
Abstract: 
We document a stark asymmetry in price discovery in equity and CDS markets: equity 
markets robustly lead CDS markets following aggregate and positive news but tend not to do 
so following other news. While difficult to reconcile with standard asset pricing theories, 
asymmetric price adjustment is common in goods markets, arising from intermediary power. 
We provide an explanation for the asymmetry based on dealers exploiting informational 
advantages vis-à-vis investors with hedging motives. In support of this we find that the 
equity-lead and its news-specificity are related to firm-level proxies for hedging demand as 
well as economy-wide measures of information asymmetries. 
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1. Introduction 
A key interest of the finance profession is in understanding how new information is 
incorporated into securities prices.  One approach is the study of price discovery across 
markets.  If new information is simultaneously priced into different markets, this is evidence 
of informational efficiency.  Evidence of one market pricing information faster than another 
by contrast suggests market inefficiencies.  Studies on price discovery abound and often find 
some sort of inefficiencies in that one market leads in price discovery.3   
In this paper we explore the idea that price discovery may in fact be news-specific. Traders in 
different markets may not be universally informed or uninformed.  Rather, traders choosing 
to operate in one market may have an advantage (or disadvantage) with respect to one type of 
information but not necessarily with respect to other innovations.4  This could cause price 
discovery not to be unconditionally in favour of one market but to depend upon the type of 
innovation.  It would also suggest a more nuanced view on the informational efficiency of 
markets – in that it may only hold conditional on specific information. 
We focus our analysis on price discovery in equity and CDS markets. The evidence on 
whether equity returns lead CDS price changes is mixed.  Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005) 
suggest that both markets move simultaneously (but that both lead the corporate bond 
market) while Norden and Weber (2009) and Hilscher, Pollet and Wilson (2012) find that 
equity returns lead CDS price changes much more frequently than the other way around.5 
                                                          
3 For example, Chan (1992) shows that equity index futures tend to lead the cash index, Hou (2007) and 
Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2011), along with many others, examine lead-lag effects between large 
and small cap equities, while Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) consider lead-lags between corporate bonds and 
equities. 
4 In Easley, O’Hara and Srinivas (1998) traders choose the market where they wish to make a trade conditional 
on each piece of information they receive. Here we take the view that certain investor groups may have a 
general preference for one market over another. 
5
 There is solid evidence that with very few exceptions CDS markets price information faster than corporate 
bond markets, although arbitrage relationships tie credit spreads and CDS prices together in the long run 
(Blanco, Brennan and Marsh, 2005).  There is also evidence that the corporate bond market lags the stock 
market (Kwan, 1996; Downing, Underwood and Xing, 2009).   
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Acharya and Johnson (2007) demonstrate that under certain market conditions (typically bad 
news about the credit quality of specific firms) changes in CDS prices lead equity returns, a 
phenomenon they ascribe to insider trading by banks with access to non-public information 
about their customers. 
We first analyze unconditional price discovery.  We use daily panel data on U.S. firms larger 
in both cross-section and time series dimensions than typically examined previously to study 
the lead-lag relationships between equity returns and CDS price changes.  We find that equity 
returns robustly lead CDS price changes.  There is very little support for the thesis that CDS 
price changes lead equity returns.  This is strong evidence in favour of an unconditional 
informational advantage of equity markets – in particular since we have constructed our 
sample to include only the most liquid CDS entities and thus have effectively biased the 
sample against finding an equity lead. 
The key focus of our paper is to investigate more precisely the nature of the information that 
is priced faster in equity rather than CDS markets.  Does the equity-lead arise for all type of 
information or only in response to some information?  We first ask whether common and 
firm-specific information are priced at different speeds.  The evidence, based on alternative 
factor decompositions, is clear – the CDS market is slow at pricing common information 
while it prices firm-specific news at about the same speed as the equity market.  The 
dominant component of systematic information in equity returns that is priced slowly by the 
CDS market is, rather surprisingly, the (equity) market factor.  One might have expected the 
(single) market factor to be more efficiently priced than news specific to individual firms.  
Second, we look at whether the lead-lag depends on whether there is positive or negative 
news in the equity market. We find that positive and negative equity market returns appear to 
be priced at different speeds by the CDS market.  Most of the lagged response of CDS prices 
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is driven by slow CDS price changes in response to positive equity market returns.  Our 
findings are therefore complementary to Acharya and Johnson (2007).  Acharya and Johnson 
argue that CDS markets can lead equities when there is bad news about a specific company, 
while our results suggest that CDS markets lag equities in pricing good news about the 
general economy. 
What can account for the news-specific nature of price discovery? We bring forward an 
explanation based on different investor groups being important in the two markets. While a 
wide range of investors with very diverse trading interests are active in equity markets, 
participation in the CDS market is much more limited. A key reason for the development of 
CDS markets was institutional investors’ demand (predominantly by banks) for an instrument 
capable of hedging credit risks. The prevalence of hedgers in CDS markets can explain both 
the aggregate-idiosyncratic news and the positive-negative news asymmetries.  As these 
investors are likely to be well informed about news specific to the firms in their portfolio, 
CDS markets respond efficiently to such news.  However, hedgers of firm risks are likely to 
focus less on macro-news.  In response to positive equity market news dealers in the CDS 
market can thus keep prices high and exploit their informational advantage.  This dampens 
price adjustment in the CDS market and causes an equity-lead specific to positive macro 
news.  In the event of bad equity market news, conversely, CDS prices rise immediately since 
in this case rapid adjustment is in the interest of dealers.6 
If this explanation is correct, we would expect the lead-lag and its asymmetries to depend on 
proxies for the hedging demand for a firm’s debt. We consider three proxies for hedging 
demand on the firm level: the amount of outstanding debt, default risk, and the variability 
                                                          
6 Asymmetric responses to positive and negative price shocks are widespread in goods markets (Bacon, 1991) 
where the phenomenon is driven by consumers facing search costs which afford intermediaries a degree of 
market power.  Recently, Green, Li and Schürhoff (2010) – interpreting search costs as informational 
asymmetries – show that such asymmetries can also occur in financial markets (municipal bond markets). 
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default risk.  We find that these proxies for hedging demand are positively and significantly 
related to observed lead-lag asymmetries, supporting the idea that the lead-lag relationship is 
driven by the hedging focus of investors in the CDS market.7 We consider this to be a key 
contribution of our paper: to our best knowledge this is the first evidence linking the 
informational efficiency of markets to differences in trading motives across markets. 
A second implication of our explanation is that in periods of high informational asymmetry 
the CDS market’s lag should be longer – because dealers then have greater pricing power vis-
à-vis uninformed investors.  We capture variations in levels of information asymmetry 
through the behaviour of equity market bid-ask spreads and by examining major 
macroeconomic news announcements.  We show that when information asymmetry is high – 
identified by either larger than usual bid-ask spreads or in days immediately preceding major 
macroeconomic news announcements – CDS returns are particularly sensitive to lagged 
positive equity returns.    
Summarizing, this paper contributes to our understanding of the informational efficiency of 
markets by showing that price discovery can be predominantly news-specific: for equity and 
CDS markets there is a stark and robust asymmetry in the pricing of new information. We 
attribute this asymmetry to the fact that traders in one market may only be informed with 
respect to some type of innovation.  Evidence using proxies for hedging demands in CDS 
markets supports the idea of the asymmetries being connected to investor clienteles with 
different information sets operating in both markets. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 
contains the empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes. 
                                                          
7 We also find evidence that the inefficiency of the CDS market is linked to limits to arbitrage, which provides 
an explanation for why dealers are able to exploit market power vis-à-vis hedgers. 
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2. Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
The CDS data used in our analysis come from Markit Group, a leading industry provider of 
credit derivatives pricing.  Markit collects CDS prices from over 30 contributing market 
makers and applies a screening process to remove outliers, stale prices and other inconsistent 
data.  Markit then computes the mean price from those contributions that pass their data 
quality tests and releases a price when it has two or more contributors.8  We use daily five-
year maturity single-name CDS prices on U.S. reference entities with publicly traded equity 
prices for the period 1st January 2004 through 14th October 2008.   
Each reference entity is matched to a traded equity identifier (Bloomberg ticker) which we 
then translate into a CRSP identifier (permno).  Matched daily closing equity mid-market 
prices are extracted from CRSP.  We use daily returns, calculated as changes in the log of 
these CDS and equity prices, as the key variables in our analysis.   
Many of the reference entities’ CDS are very illiquid.  These are flagged as such in the 
database (this indicator refers to liquidity at the point in time when the database was created).  
To concentrate our analysis on the most liquid firms, we retain only those reference entities 
flagged as liquid in the database and with non-zero daily CDS returns for at least 90% of the 
sample period analysed.  We also only retain entities with CDS (and equity) prices available 
for the full sample period and we exclude companies with significant merger and acquisition 
activities.  The final data set comprises 193 reference entities, each with 1,208 daily return 
observations for both equities and CDS.  The firms retained are detailed in Appendix B. 
                                                          
8
 Markit data is widely used in the literature (see, for example, Acharya and Johnson (2007), Jorion and Zhang 
(2007) and Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2009)).   
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Table 1 reports some basic descriptive statistics.  Univariate statistics suggest equity and CDS 
daily returns are broadly comparable, although the standard deviation of CDS returns is 
higher.  CDS prices on average increased in the sample and the distribution of returns is 
positively skewed.  Equity prices fell, on average, and the distribution of equity returns is 
negatively skewed.  More important patterns emerge from the correlation statistics.  Equity 
returns exhibit very low autocorrelations, while those for the CDS market are much larger in 
magnitude, especially at the first lag.  Cross-autocorrelations also differ markedly.  Lagged 
CDS returns are only weakly (negatively) correlated with equity returns but the first lag of 
equity returns is strongly negatively correlated with CDS returns.  The magnitude of this 
correlation is similar to the magnitude of the contemporaneous correlation.  The magnitude of 
the correlation with the second lag of equity returns is markedly smaller.  Together, the 
significantly positive autocorrelation and significantly negative correlation with lagged equity 
returns are indicative of inefficiencies in the CDS market. 
 
3. Analysis 
3.1 Equity-CDS Lead-Lag Relationships 
Several papers have noted that, in general, equity returns lead CDS returns.  There are 
occasions when the reverse appears to be true but these are not long-lasting periods of time, 
nor are they necessarily common for all entities.  The first goal of this paper is to establish the 
robustness of the unconditional lead-lag relationship between equities and CDS for our panel.  
We emphasise that our data selection procedure produces a sample of reference entities with 
the most liquid CDS markets.  As such, any evidence of a lag in the price discovery process 
for these firms would be suggestive of even more pronounced lags for less liquid entities. 
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We model the returns of equities and CDS in a standard bivariate vector autoregression 
(VAR) system of lag order k: 
     kj etic jtijkj e jtijeti rrr 1 ,,21 ,10,         (1a)
      kj ctic jtijkj e jtijcti rrr 1 ,,21 ,10,       (1b) 
where the dependent variables are the returns (r) on the equity (e) or CDS (c) of firm i at time 
t.  Lag lengths are chosen according to the Akaike information criterion (but our results are 
not sensitive to changes in lag lengths).  Not surprisingly, given the autocorrelation patterns 
described in Table 1, in the vast majority of cases the criterion selects just one lag.  CDS 
returns would be deemed to lag equity returns for firm i if the β1 coefficients are jointly non-
zero, and equities would lag CDSs if the α2 coefficients are jointly non-zero.9 
Panel A of Table 2 summarises the results of estimating VARs for each reference entity 
individually and for all entities pooled together.  The dominant finding is that lagged equity 
returns contain information for current CDS price changes, while the reverse is rarely the 
case.  Specifically, we find that of the 193 reference entities studied, lagged equity returns are 
significant in explaining current CDS returns in 149 cases at the five percent level.  Lagged 
CDS returns explain equity returns for only 12 entities.  The results of estimating the pooled 
VAR are fully consistent.  The results in Panel A are based on regressions at the firm level.  
In Panel B we show that the same findings hold when we analyse returns from equally 
weighted equity and CDS portfolios.   
                                                          
9 Acharya and Johnson (2007) use a different specification in their VAR which includes interactions of the 
stock returns (both contemporaneous and lagged) with the inverse CDS level to capture the likely non-linear 
relation between CDS and equity returns.  However, this interaction term is not significant for 155 of the 193 
firms in our data set and so we do not include it in our specifications.  Our main findings are not sensitive to this 
decision. 
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In sum, unconditionally, equity returns lead CDS price changes. These results are very robust 
to alternative specifications of equation (1) and to splitting the data in various ways (details 
are provided in Appendix A). 
 
3.2 Asymmetric response to common and firm-specific information 
In this sub-section we explore further the nature of the information that is being incorporated 
faster into equity prices than CDS prices.  The consistency of the firm and portfolio level 
lead-lag results detailed in section 3.1 suggests that it is not just idiosyncratic information that 
is priced slowly in CDS markets and that there appears to be a systematic component.  We 
therefore use several techniques to split equity and CDS returns into common factor and 
idiosyncratic components to determine the contribution of each to the delay in CDS pricing. 
We begin with a statistical decomposition of returns based on principal components (PC) 
analysis.  Using the full sample of data we extract p principal components for equity returns 
and q components for CDS returns.  We then regress equity returns on the p equity principal 
components and collect, for each entity, a fitted series and a residual series.  We view the 
fitted series as capturing the systematic or common component of each firm’s equity returns 
while the residual series is assumed to capture the firm-specific component.  We do the same 
for each firm’s CDS returns using the q CDS principal components.   
We then perform a VAR analysis using these decomposed returns (we also perform 
regressions using common and idiosyncratic components of CDS returns as dependent 
variables for completeness): 
ecom
ti
cidio
ti
ccom
ti
eidio
ti
ecom
ti
ecom
ti rrrrr ,1,141,131,121,1110,       (2a) 
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ti rrrrr ,1,241,231,221,2120,       (2b) 
ccom
ti
cidio
ti
ccom
ti
eidio
ti
ecom
ti
ccom
ti rrrrr ,1,141,131,121,1110,       (2c) 
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ti rrrrr ,1,241,231,221,2120,       (2d) 
Significant values for β11 (β12) would suggest that the common (idiosyncratic) component of 
firm i’s lagged equity returns is important in explaining the common component of i’s CDS 
returns.  Similarly, significant values for β21 (β22) would imply that the common 
(idiosyncratic) component of lagged equity returns is important in explaining the firm-
specific CDS return for the firm.   
The choice of how many principal components to retain is rather arbitrary and we do not take 
a firm stand on the issue.  If too few components are retained then components of the returns 
which are actually common are incorrectly labelled as idiosyncratic.  Retain too many 
components and idiosyncratic elements of returns are incorrectly thought to be common.  
Thankfully, the tenor of our results is not sensitive to the exact number of components 
retained as long as the number of common components is at least one for both equities and 
CDS returns.   
We report results based on three retained components for both equity and CDS returns in 
Panel A of Table 3.  The results are quite stark.  For 173 of the 193 companies, the lagged 
common component of equity returns significantly predicts the current common component 
of CDS returns.  By contrast, the lagged common CDS component is never significant in 
predicting the common equity component.   
Second, there is some relatively weak evidence that lagged idiosyncratic equity returns 
predict idiosyncratic CDS returns (significant at 5% level for 28 companies, or 14.5% of the 
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sample).  The CDS market leads in the pricing of idiosyncratic information for 11.4 percent 
of the sample (22 companies). 
Third, and as we would expect, there is little evidence that idiosyncratic equity returns predict 
common CDS returns, or that common equity returns predict idiosyncratic CDS returns.   
The lead-lag relations between equity and CDS returns seen in the literature and confirmed in 
section 3.1 are hence almost entirely driven by the equity market’s ability to incorporate 
common information faster than the CDS market. To a much lesser extent, the equity market 
also appears able to incorporate firm-specific information faster, although there are also cases 
where the CDS market leads in pricing idiosyncratic information.  This final point probably 
reflects the insider trading issues raised in the conditional analysis of Acharya and Johnson 
(2007). 
To confirm the results using equity factors motivated by the literature, rather than statistically 
derived principal components, we repeat the analysis using the three Fama-French factors.10  
Since there is no recognised factor model for CDS returns we revert to using total CDS 
returns in the regressions.  Results are reported in Panel B of Table 3.  Lagged fitted equity 
returns based on the three Fama-French factors are significant for CDS returns for 178 
companies (92% of the sample) while the lagged residual equity returns not explained by 
these factors are significant for 40 firms (21% of the sample).  We find almost exactly the 
same results if we use three principal components instead of Fama-French factors – lagged 
fitted returns are significant for 179 firms, and lagged residual returns are significant for 18 
firms.  Correlation analysis between the largest principal components for equity returns and 
Fama-French factors suggests that the first principal component is a very close proxy for the 
                                                          
10
 The returns on the Fama-French factors were sourced from Ken French’s website. 
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market.  However, none of the other principal components correlate strongly with the Fama-
French factors.   
The similarity of the lead-lag results from PC and Fama-French-based analyses combined 
with the fact that these two approaches only appear to share one common factor suggest that 
the equity market return is behind most of the results.  We proxy the equity market return in 
three ways – the first principal component, the return on an equally weighted portfolio of the 
equities in our sample, and the market return from the Fama-French database.  Panel C of 
Table 3 reports the results of using lagged fitted values and lagged residuals from all three 
measures to explain CDS returns (with lagged CDS returns also included in the regressions).  
The results are quite consistent.  Lagged equity market returns significantly explain CDS 
returns for a very large proportion of firms.  Lagged idiosyncratic equity returns are much 
less frequently significant.  It appears that the lead-lag relationship between equities and 
CDSs is mainly driven by a single common equity component – the market return.11 
 
3.3 Asymmetric response to positive and negative news 
So far we have imposed symmetrical responses of CDS returns to positive and negative 
lagged equity returns.  We now relax this constraint and allow positive lagged equity returns 
to bear a different coefficient to negative returns.  We regress the common component of 
CDS returns for each firm on lags of itself, lagged positive equity market returns and lagged 
negative equity market returns.  Market returns are proxied by the return on an equally 
                                                          
11 Although the focus of this paper is on the cross asset-class information spillover, the autoregressive 
coefficient for CDS returns is very large, suggesting that while there is some information in lagged equity 
returns there appears to also be even more information in lagged CDS returns.  Table 3, panel A confirms the 
inability of the CDS market to incorporate common information quickly.  For all 193 companies, the lagged 
common component of CDS returns is significant in explaining the current common component.  Lagged 
idiosyncratic CDS returns are also significant in explaining the current idiosyncratic component of CDS returns 
for around 42% of the firms. 
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weighted portfolio of the equities in our sample but our results are not sensitive to alternative 
measures. Specifically, we use the following specification 
ccom
ti
eneg
tm
epos
tm
ccom
ti
ccom
ti rrrr ,1,31,21,10,         (3) 
The results are reported in Table 4.   For all 193 firms, the coefficient of common CDS 
returns on lagged positive equity market returns is negative and significantly different from 
zero.  The cross-sectional mean of the coefficient on lagged positive equity returns is -0.5.12  
The coefficient on lagged negative equity returns is also generally negative, averaging -0.16, 
but is significant for just 106 firms (55% of the sample).   The restriction that the coefficients 
on positive and negative equity returns are equal is rejected in 56 cases (29% of the sample) 
although in every case the coefficient on lagged positive equity returns is larger in absolute 
terms than the coefficient on negative returns.   We obtain very similar results if we use total 
CDS returns as the dependent variable – coefficient values barely change and while the 
coefficient on positive equity returns is statistically significant, that on negative equity market 
returns is not.   
The p-values reported in the first row of Table 4 are from a test that the average coefficient 
value is zero.  This test assumes independence across firms, which is unlikely to be valid.  As 
an alternative, we pool the data and run a single regression for the whole sample with 
standard errors clustered by time (double clustering by time and firm, or including firm fixed 
effects leave the results essentially unchanged).  We report these results in the second row.  
The coefficient on lagged positive equity returns is larger in magnitude than that on lagged 
negative equity returns.  The test of coefficient equality is not significant but note that by 
pooling the data we impose the same coefficients on all firms.  As we expand upon later, 
                                                          
12
 If we use raw CDS returns rather than the common component the average coefficient is essentially 
unchanged (-0.56) although significance levels fall. 
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there is important coefficient heterogeneity in the cross section and hence the clustered 
standard errors are likely to be too large. 
Finally, we run a version of this equation using equally-weighted portfolio returns.  We 
regress portfolio CDS returns on a lagged dependent variable and lagged positive and 
negative portfolio equity returns series:  
c
tm
eneg
tm
epos
tm
c
tm
c
tm rrrr ,1,31,21,10,          (4) 
The coefficients on both positive and negative equity returns are significantly negative, 
though only marginally so in the case of negative returns (see the last row of Table 4).  The 
absolute value of coefficient is much larger for positive returns than negative returns (-0.49 
compared with -0.17) and equality of these coefficients is rejected.  Partitioning lagged CDS 
returns into positive and negative components also has no effect on our results since they bear 
effectively the same coefficient.  
 
3.4 The lead-lag relationship, hedging demand and informational asymmetries 
We have so far established three robust sets of results: i) the equity markets leads the CDS 
market in price discovery but this lead is specific to ii) common news, and, iii) positive news. 
The presence of lead-lag relationships across markets documented in sections 3.1-3.3 is at 
odds with market efficiency.  Moreover, the news-specific nature of the lead-lags 
demonstrated in sections 3.2-3.3 rules out standard explanations such as arbitrage risk or 
transactions cost since these would be expected to apply regardless of the type of news.13  
Hilscher, Pollet and Wilson (2012) for example, argue that the CDS lag reflects a separating 
                                                          
13
 McQueen, Pinegar and Thorley (1996) also emphasise this point in their discussion of asymmetric cross serial 
correlations for large and small cap stock returns. 
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equilibrium where informed traders only trade in equities due to high bid-ask spreads in CDS 
markets.  This explanation is not consistent with our findings that firm-specific and negative 
equity market news is priced approximately equally rapidly by both markets.14  
While relatively unexplored in the finance literature, asymmetric adjustment of prices to 
changes in fundamentals is a frequent phenomenon in goods markets, termed “rockets and 
feathers” (Bacon, 1991).  In a study of 242 goods markets, Peltzman (2000) finds that in two-
thirds of the markets the upward adjustment of prices in response to a positive (cost) shock is 
faster than the downward response of prices to a negative shock of similar magnitude.  Prices 
thus rise like rockets but fall like feathers.  While smacking of collusive actions by 
intermediaries, such price setting behaviour is consistent with profit-maximizing behaviour of 
imperfectly competitive intermediaries who face customers that are rational but only 
partially-informed (Tappata, 2009).  In most goods markets the intermediary buys in 
wholesale markets against well-informed participants but sells in retail markets to consumers 
that are less informed about the nature of costs in the market.  Since search costs prevent 
consumers from locating the lowest available price for the good, intermediaries can set 
relatively high prices following cost reductions, exploiting their market power and extracting 
rent.  When costs rise, conversely, they immediately pass on these increases to consumers 
and so prices rise accordingly. 
Such behaviour has recently also been documented in the finance literature.  Green, Li and 
Schürhoff (2010) find that there is an asymmetric response by U.S. municipal bond yields to 
Treasury bond yield shocks.  They show that muni bond prices rapidly rise when Treasury 
bonds prices increase yet they fall very slowly following a drop in T-bond prices.  Green et 
al. argue that asymmetries in the clientele in muni bonds – with the buy side dominated by 
                                                          
14
 The relatively good ability of the CDS market in pricing negative (equity) news may arise from short-selling 
constraints in the equity market.  However, short-selling constraints cannot explain the differential response to 
common and idiosyncratic news and are also inconsistent with evidence provided later in this section. 
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retail customers while the sell side includes both retail and institutional sellers – are behind 
these results.  They translate the search costs faced by retail consumers in goods markets into 
information asymmetries in asset markets such that the sell side is, on average, better 
informed than the buy side due to the presence of informed institutions in the former. 
As we have demonstrated, the CDS market displays similar pricing behaviour.  In the 
remainder of the paper we explore whether the rockets and feathers hypothesis can explain 
our results.  The hypothesis relies on there being an asymmetry in the clientele faced by 
dealers on different sides of the market, with one side likely to be less informed than the 
dealer and the participants on the other side of the market.  We will argue below that while 
the CDS market is dominated by institutional traders, there is a class of customers present 
predominantly on the protection-buying side of the market – credit risk hedgers – who may 
be less focussed on the consequences of some types of news. 
Following this, we test two implications of the rockets and feathers hypothesis.  First, the 
larger the market share of the relatively uninformed participants, the longer the CDS market 
lag as dealers can exploit their market power to a greater extent.  Since we argue that the 
relatively uninformed are likely to be credit risk hedgers, we relate the magnitude of the CDS 
market’s lag in the cross-section to several proxies for hedging demand.  Second, if 
information asymmetries are behind the lead-lag relationships then longer CDS market lags 
should be observed when information asymmetries are high. To examine this prediction, we 
analyze the impact of variations in two types of information asymmetries across time on the 
lead-lag.   
 
3.4.1 The lead-lag relation, limits to arbitrage, and the demand for hedging credit risks 
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A key difference between equity and CDS markets arises from different motivations for 
trading in these markets and (ultimately related) the types of investors that are active in these 
markets. Equity markets are characterized by a wide group of investors – private investors 
and most types of institutional investors trade equities – and the motives for trading are 
manifold.  Furthermore, investors are, on average, equally active on both the buy and sell side 
of the equity market.  There is no pronounced asymmetry in clientele in equity markets. 
Credit derivatives markets are much more limited in scope.  Participants in this market are 
almost exclusively institutional investors, with banks forming the largest group: 60% of CDS 
protection in 2006 (the mid-year in our sample) was bought by banks, 28% by hedge funds 
and 6% by insurance companies (source: BBA, 2006).  A key motive for banks taking CDS 
positions is to hedge (about one third of their credit derivatives positions are held in the loan 
book). This hedging demand is largely passive as it is determined by the lending business of 
banks, which is governed by medium-to-long term considerations.  The importance of the 
hedging motive in CDS markets creates a natural asymmetry.  
We hypothesise that the trading desks of banks and other potentially well-informed 
participants both buy and sell credit protection through CDS contracts.  However, the credit 
risk management (CRM) desks of banks concentrate their trading on just one side of the 
market, buying credit protection.  Due to the information generated by their banks’ lending 
activities, they are possibly well-informed about firm-specific news (as discussed by Acharya 
and Johnson, 2007) but we argue that they may be relatively uninformed with respect to 
credit risk implications of market-wide information. One explanation for the CRM desk's lack 
of focus on market-wide information may be that it considers its bank to be (independently) 
hedged against broad market movements, leaving the desk free to concentrate on managing 
firm-specific risks. 
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The presence of a large group of uninformed participants in a market ought not have 
important efficiency implications if dealers are competitive.  However, CDS dealers have 
market power for at least two reasons.  First, the CDS market is a bilateral over the counter 
market with no centralised quote disclosure mechanism.  As there is no central counterparty 
system, counterparties need to enter into an ISDA Master Agreement before they can trade 
against each other.  It is unlikely that hedgers enter into agreements with all dealers and 
hence they are limited in who they can trade against at any point in time.  Second, protection 
bought on Firm X from Bank A is different from protection bought on Firm X from Bank B 
since the probability of joint default of Firm X and the protection writing bank differs.15 
There is therefore a degree of product differentiation across dealers.  Product differentiation 
has been identified as a contributory factor to asymmetric price adjustment in goods markets.  
The consequences of information asymmetry across participants and a less than fully 
competitive dealer networks are as follows.  When firm-specific news arrives, all participants 
in the CDS market are well informed.  They cannot be exploited by market makers, resulting 
in an efficient pricing in the CDS market. When macro news occurs, hedgers tend to be 
relatively less well informed. CDS prices will still be efficient in the case of bad news, as in 
this case it is in the interest of market makers to pass on the higher cost of protection to the 
hedgers. However, in the case of good economic news, market makers can exploit their 
informational advantage vis-à-vis hedgers and delay lowering the cost of protection. Pricing 
in the CDS market then becomes inefficient.   
If our explanation has any bearing, we would expect the CDS lag in the presence of good 
news to depend on the importance of uninformed hedgers.  In particular, if there is no 
hedging demand for a specific firm, the response of CDS prices to good and bad news ought 
to be equivalent.  The higher the demand by hedgers, the slower the response is when good 
                                                          
15 Arora, Gandhi and Longstaff (2010) show that these risk differences are priced in CDS markets. 
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news occurs, although there ought not be much cross-sectional variation in the response to 
bad news.16 We therefore next study whether various proxies of hedging can explain cross-
sectional variations in the lead-lag to equity market news.17 
We consider three determinants of hedging demand on the firm level:  
1. Outstanding debt. The higher the debt of the firm, the higher should be the demand 
for hedging. We measure debt by the log of the average total outstanding long-term 
debt of a firm, which we extract from Compustat at a quarterly frequency.   
2. Default risk. Qiu and Yu (2012) posit a non-linear relation between hedging demand 
and the level of default risk.  Briefly, their argument runs as follows.  Top-quality 
credits face little hedging demand since insurance is deemed unnecessary, but as 
credit quality falls hedgers increasingly purchase credit protection.  Once assets fall 
below investment grade, however, the cost of insurance becomes excessive. In 
addition, many investors have already been forced to sell the asset due to mandates 
and remaining investors are likely to bear the risk of further deterioration.  We use the 
numerical long-term S&P credit rating variable as a proxy for firm risk (whereby a 
AAA rating translates to 1, AA to 2 etc).18  We compute a time-weighted average 
rating level for each firm in the cross-section.  We allow for non-linearity in the 
relationship by including a quadratic term. 
3. Default risk volatility.  A firm whose default risk varies substantially tends to require 
more frequent adjustments in hedging positions.  Hedging-motivated trading should 
                                                          
16
 Alternatively, one may look whether a firm’s lead-lag is related to the actual trading of banks in the firm’s 
CDS. However, data on banks’ CDS positions on a firm-basis are not available. 
17 There may also be variations in hedging demand over time. In particular, we would expect higher hedging 
demand during times of crises. This is consistent with our findings in Section 3.1 that the equity-CDS lead-lag is 
higher during the crisis of 2007-2008. 
18 It might be argued that risk increases demand for trading in the CDS of a firm generally (and regardless of 
whether it is for speculative or hedging purposes). However, in this case we would expect the lead-lag and the 
asymmetries to decrease in firm risk as more trading should increase the efficiency of the CDS market. 
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be more important for such a firm.  We proxy this effect by the (log of the) standard 
deviation of CDS returns in the sample. 
It should be pointed out that any importance of passive hedgers for price formation requires 
limits to arbitrage across the two markets.  However, Kapadia and Pu (2012) document 
significant short-term pricing discrepancies across equity and CDS markets, and ascribe these 
to limited arbitrage capital flows between the two.  In our analysis, we include two proxies 
for arbitrage costs as controls for limits to arbitrage: 
1. Transactions costs.  Illiquidity constrains the actions of an arbitrageur since entering 
into or unwinding a position in a timely manner will impact price and make arbitrage 
costly.  A lower level of liquidity is therefore expected to reduce arbitrage activity.  
We use the average bid-ask spread on the equity of the firm as a simple measure of 
illiquidity. 
2. Idiosyncratic risk.  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Pontiff (2006) argue that exposure 
to idiosyncratic risk deters arbitrage.  In the case of CDS-equity arbitrage, Kapadia 
and Pu (2012) note that an imperfect hedge caused by an incorrect or out of date 
hedge ratio leaves the arbitrageur with an unhedged position in the firm.  Arbitrage 
flows are hence less likely for firms with high idiosyncratic risk.  We measure 
idiosyncratic risk as the (log of the) standard deviation of the residuals from a 
regression of daily equity returns on the market return. 
Since higher limits to arbitrage should lead to more pronounced efficiencies, we expect the 
arbitrage cost proxies to be positively associated with cross-market lead-lags. Importantly, 
significance of the limit to arbitrage proxies also provides an explanation for why dealers are 
able to exploit informational asymmetries across markets. 
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We study the cross-sectional relation between a firm’s CDS lag and hedging demand by 
running the following regression: 
iiiii CAHLagCoeff   321       (5) 
The dependent variable (the CDS lag) is one or more of the coefficients obtained from firm-
by-firm estimation of equation (4). The explanatory variables fall into three categories: H 
refers to the set of hedging proxies, A refers to a set of arbitrage costs and C refers to general 
control variables. As a control, we first use the (log of) average equity market capitalisation 
to capture size effects. In addition, we include the average level of the CDS price. This 
variable may proxy for various factors such as the market’s attention to a specific firm 
(higher attention is expected for firms with a higher CDS price) or the extent to which a firm 
is subject to informational asymmetries (for a firm with a low CDS price there is limited 
potential to gain from information acquisition and hence asymmetries are expected to be 
low). 
The first column of Table 5 reports regression results where the CDS lag is the estimated 
coefficient on lagged positive equity market returns from equation (4) (that is, β2i). Since the 
dependent variable in (5) is an estimated coefficient, we use weighted least squares for the 
estimation (with weights inversely proportional to the variance of the coefficient estimates in 
the first-stage regression).   
The hedging proxies are all significant and have the expected sign. In particular, long term 
debt enters negatively, indicating that larger hedging demand due to higher debt exposures 
increase inefficiencies in the CDS market. The rating variable is significantly negative while 
rating squared is significantly positive. Thus, as firm quality declines the CDS lag initially 
becomes more pronounced but at a sufficiently high degree of default risk the relationship 
reverses. Interestingly, the coefficients imply that this happens at a single-A rating.  This non-
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linear relation is consistent with the argument put forward in Qiu and Yu (2012) that hedging 
demand is maximised near the boundary between investment grade and non-investment 
grade. Finally, the standard deviation of CDS returns has the expected negative sign, 
indicating that more frequent adjustments in hedging behaviour lead to a reduced CDS lag.  
Among the proxies for arbitrage costs, illiquidity in the equity market is associated with a 
significantly larger CDS lag, consistent with higher inefficiencies when arbitrage becomes 
more costly. The second arbitrage limit proxy, idiosyncratic volatility, however, does not 
significantly affect the CDS lag. Turning to the general control variables, it can be seen that 
market capitalization (the size proxy) significantly reduces the CDS lag. This is consistent 
with the notion that asset markets for larger firms are generally more efficient. The average 
CDS price is negatively associated with the CDS lag – but the relationship is only marginally 
significant. The negative sign may reflect that the scope for informational asymmetries is 
larger for firms that have higher CDS prices. 
A potential concern is that the hedging results may be driven by multicollinearity between the 
hedging and the arbitrage cost proxies. However, the correlation among these groups of 
proxies is modest; the highest correlation arises between the rating variable and equity 
illiquidity and is -0.20. We also ran a regression excluding the arbitrage cost proxies 
(unreported); the results do not change in any important way. Finally, it should be noted that 
the explanatory power coming from the hedging variables is substantial: while the R2 in 
column 1 is 0.345, the R2 drops to 0.004 when hedging variables are excluded.  
The results from this regression are supportive of the rockets and feathers hypothesis since 
they confirm that the CDS market's slow incorporation of positive equity market news is 
related to hedging demand. However, we can exploit this setting further. The hypothesis 
suggests that, while the lag with respect to positive stock market news should be related to 
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hedging proxies, the lag following negative news should not. This provides us with an 
important placebo test. The second column in Table 5 reports the results when the dependent 
variable is the coefficient on the CDS response to lagged negative equity news.  We see that 
there is no longer significance for any of the hedging proxies (only the squared rating 
variable enters with marginal significance).  
Finally, the third column in Table 5 reports results where the dependent variable is the 
difference between positive and negative equity market news (that is, β2i-β3i from equation 
(5)).  The results are largely unchanged from those reported in the first column.  In particular, 
the hedging proxies are all significant and signed as expected. 
Taken together, the results in this section corroborate the idea that the asymmetry in the lead-
lag relationship is driven by the presence of passive hedgers which allow CDS dealers to 
maintain high protection prices in the advent of positive news. 
 
3.4.2 The lead-lag relation and information asymmetries 
The rockets and feathers hypothesis relies on participants on one side of the market being, on 
average, less informed about the true value of the asset than the dealers and the participants 
on the other side.  We have established that variation in proxies for hedging demand are 
correlated with the magnitude of the CDS market’s lag in the face of good equity market 
news.  In this section we test whether the lag is also related to informational asymmetries, 
exploiting time-series variations. 
Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2011) argue that an important economic announcement 
ought to resolve uncertainty.  Hence, information asymmetries ought to be high immediately 
prior to this news announcement, and lead-lags should be relatively large.  Our previous 
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results suggest that macroeconomic rather than firm-specific information is important in 
explaining the equity lead over the CDS market.  Consequently, we focus on three key U.S. 
macroeconomics announcements: the release of advanced GDP estimates, the employment 
situation announcement (which includes non-farm payroll figures), and the producer price 
index release.22  We construct three indicator variables:  DAY takes the value of one on the 
day that one of these announcements was made (and zero otherwise); PRE takes the value of 
one on the day immediately prior to an announcement (and zero otherwise); NONE takes the 
value of one if the other two indicator variables both equal zero (and is zero otherwise).23  
Since the previous results suggest that good news is critical to understanding the lagged 
response of the CDS market we interact these three indicators with the lagged positive 
component of the return on an equally-weighted portfolio of equity returns.  The lagged 
negative component of equity returns is included but is not interacted with the indicator 
variables.24  We run the following regression:  
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If information asymmetries are important in explaining the magnitude of the CDS market’s 
lag behind the equity market then we would expect α1 < α3 < α2 since the coefficient on 
lagged good equity market performance should be more negative than usual on days 
immediately preceding announcements, and less negative than usual on announcement 
days.25 
Coefficient point estimates reported in the first column of Table 6 are supportive of the 
hypothesised relationship in that the coefficient orderings are correct, and all three 
                                                          
22
 In some months the consumer price index was announced before the producer price index. In these months we 
use the day of the consumer price index release. 
23
 In the few instances where announcements occur on successive days, PRE takes the value of one only on the 
day prior to the first announcement. 
24
 Interaction terms with the negative component are insignificant when included. 
25
 The uninteracted indicator variables are each far from significant when added to equation (6). 
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coefficients are significantly negative suggesting that CDS returns are slow to incorporate 
good news irrespective of information asymmetries.  However, the test of equality between 
the three coefficients cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels as the standard 
errors on these coefficients are relatively large.26  To increase the power of the test we pool 
data on individual firms and rerun the regression.27  Results are reported in the second 
column of the table. Again, the coefficient estimates are supportive of the hypothesis and the 
p-value of the equality of coefficients restriction is just 0.06.  We interpret these results as 
(weakly) confirming that information asymmetries are behind the CDS market’s lag relative 
to the equity market. 
Our second time-series based test is also derived from Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam 
(2011).  They reason that increased information asymmetry will result in widening bid-ask 
spreads and decreased liquidity in the lead market – equities in our case.  Increases in the bid-
ask spreads for equities then predict slower adjustment of CDS returns to (positive) stock 
market returns.28  We measure stock-level illiquidity using the daily proportional bid-ask 
spread on each firm in our sample (sourced from CRSP) and construct a daily equally-
weighted average spread across stocks (denoted SP).  We interact SP t with positive and 
negative components of equity market returns, and include these interactions as additional 
regressors in portfolio-level regressions: 
                                                          
26 The standard errors on all three coefficients are larger than the standard error on the single coefficient on 
lagged positive equity market returns reported in the final row of Table 4, particularly for the relatively 
infrequently occurring announcement day dummy. 
27
 Pooling in this way risks reducing power as the cross-sectional variation in coefficients on lagged equity 
market news is large.  An alternative approach to improve the precision of the estimates of α1 and α2 might be to 
increase the number of announcements included in the analysis.  However this risks pooling important 
macroeconomic releases with less important ones, which reduces our ability to discriminate between days with 
high and low information asymmetries. 
28
 Note that a negative correlation between equity market illiquidity and the magnitude of the lagged response of 
CDS returns would be suggested by Barberis and Shleifer’s (2003) model in which random liquidity demands 
with systematic components are traded first in large cap stocks and later in other assets.  Such liquidity trading 
would decrease equity market illiquidity while increasing the magnitude of the lead-lag relationship.  This could 
be viewed as an alternative hypothesis to the one we propose. 
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(7) 
Results are reported in Table 7 for portfolio CDS returns and for pooled individual returns.  
The coefficients on the interaction of spreads with positive equity market movements are 
negative and statistically significant, supporting the idea that information leading to widening 
equity spreads and a rising equity market is incorporated into CDS prices with a relatively 
long lag.  Importantly, the results suggest that it is not the direction of news per se that drives 
the asymmetry since restricting the coefficients on lagged positive and negative equity market 
to be equal is not rejected and barely alters the goodness of fit.  Rather it is the direction of 
news combined with high levels of asymmetric information that drive the asymmetry in the 
lead-lag relationship. Conversely, the coefficients on the interaction of spreads with negative 
equity news are significantly positive, although the coefficient magnitude is much smaller 
than for positive news.  This suggests that bad news actually reduces the lag of the CDS 
market. 
This sub-section has focussed on demonstrating that information asymmetries lie behind the 
equity market lead over the CDS market.  In line with the rockets and feathers hypothesis we 
show that at times of high information asymmetry, such as immediately prior to important 
macroeconomic announcements or when market-wide equity bid-ask spreads are high and the 
news is positive, the equity market’s lead is maximised.  Conversely, when asymmetries are 
low, the lead is small. 
  
Conclusions 
This paper has analyzed lead-lag patterns in equity and CDS markets. Using a large dataset 
we have documented a strong and robust advantage of the equity market over the CDS 
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market in pricing new information. We have also documented that this advantage is mainly 
due to the pricing of aggregate and positive information in the equity market.  A potential 
explanation for this is the presence of institutional investors with hedging demands in the 
CDS market. While these investors may be well informed about news specific to the firms in 
their portfolio, they may behave relatively passively in the advent of macro news.  Dealers 
can exploit their local market power following good equity market news and maintain 
relatively high CDS prices when hedgers are not fully informed about the fall in the true price 
of protection.  Conversely, after bad equity market news, CDS prices rise much more rapidly 
since it is in the dealers’ best interest to raise prices for protection buyers. 
Consistent with this hypothesis we have shown that the lead-lag is stronger for firms for 
which there is larger hedging demand.  We have also presented evidence in favour of the 
pricing advantage of the equity market being related to informational asymmetries, as the 
equity-lead is more pronounced at times of higher macroeconomic uncertainty (as measured 
by days prior to macroeconomic announcements and high bid-ask spreads).  By contrast, our 
evidence does not lend support to alternative explanations of the lead-lag that are consistent 
with efficient markets. 
Our paper strikes a negative note on the efficiency of CDS markets.  CDS markets are widely 
considered to be the most efficient means of pricing credit risk.  As such, one would expect 
them to do also relatively well compared with equity markets.  However, our results show 
that this is not the case as we find a strong lead for equity markets.  Perhaps most 
disturbingly, the lead arises from supposedly easy-to-price economy-wide information, such 
as the equity-market factor.  It should also be recalled that we have centred our sample on the 
firms with the most liquid CDS contracts, thus effectively biasing us against finding 
inefficiencies in the CDS market.  
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Our analysis indicates that the inefficiency of the CDS market is caused by the presence of 
institutional investors with a passive demand for hedging. This suggests that the composition 
of investors in a market can have important implications for pricing inefficiencies, especially 
when some classes of investor are informed (or uninformed) about certain types of news.  
More research in this area seems warranted – in particular understanding whether the pricing 
properties of other markets and assets (for example, CDS versus bond markets or large versus 
small firm stocks) can also be linked to the presence (or lack) of certain investor groups. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides summary statistics of the key returns series used in the paper.  The sample runs from 1st 
January 2004 through 14th October 2008 (1208 observations per firm), and there are 193 firms in the data set.  
Figures in rows denoted Autocorrelation 1, 2 and 3 give autocorrelations with one, two and three lags.  Figures 
in rows denoted Cross-autocorrelation 1, 2 and 3 give correlations between the time t-dated returns of the asset 
in that column and returns of the other asset at times t-1, t-2 and t-3.  Statistics are calculated from the pooled 
data set. 
 Equity returns CDS returns 
Mean -0.0003 0.0014 
25th percentile -0.0090 -0.0098 
75th percentile 0.0091 0.0095 
Standard Deviation 0.0238 0.0351 
Skew -6.1305 2.4295 
Autocorrelation 1 0.0239 0.2137 
Autocorrelation 2 -0.0530 0.1106 
Autocorrelation 3 -0.0093 0.0377 
Cross-correlation -0.1886 -0.1886 
Cross-autocorrelation 1 -0.0145 -0.1487 
Cross-autocorrelation 2 -0.0235 -0.0255 
Cross-autocorrelation 3 -0.0089 -0.0310 
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Table 2 
Bivariate VAR Results 
The table reports the results of a bivariate vector autoregression of daily equity and CDS returns with one lag.  
The relevant dependent variable is given in the first column of each row.  The first two rows of Panel A report 
average OLS results (coefficient values and R2 values) across the 193 individual firms together with a count of 
the number of firms with coefficients significant at the 5% level.  The latter is also expressed as a percentage of 
the total sample of 193 firms.  The p-val figure is that resulting from a test that the average coefficient value is 
zero.  The second two rows of Panel A report pooled regression results.  Panel B reports results of a bivariate 
vector autoregression of daily equity and CDS equally weighted portfolio returns with one lag.  OLS results use 
standard errors robust to unspecified heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.  Pooled regressions report p-
values based on standard errors robust to unspecified heteroscedasticity and double clustered by day and by 
firm.  The full sample runs from 1st January 2004 through 14th October 2008 (1208 observations per firm).    
 
 Lagged equity returns Lagged CDS returns R2 
 
Coefficient 
(p-val) 
Count 
significant 
(% signif.) 
Coefficient 
(p-val) 
Count 
significant 
(% signif.) 
 
Panel A:      
Individual firms     
Equity returns -0.025  (0.648) 
20      
(10.4%) 
-0.001   
(0.977) 
12        
(6.2%) 0.008 
CDS returns -0.201  (0.011) 
149    
(77.2%) 
0.197   
(0.001) 
157    
(81.3%) 0.076 
Pooled firms      
Equity returns 0.021   (0.517)  
-0.007  
(0.582)  0.001 
CDS returns -0.166  (0.000)  
0.191   
(0.000)  0.057 
Panel B:      
Equity port. returns -0.027  (0.599)  
0.024   
(0.612)  0.003 
CDS port. returns -0.306  (0.000)  
0.408   
(0.000)  0.279 
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Table 3 
 Factor VAR Results 
The table reports the results of vector autoregressions of daily factor decomposed equity and CDS returns with one lag.  The table reports average results (coefficient values 
and R2 values) across the 193 individual firms together with a count of the number of firms with coefficients significant at the 5% level.  The latter is also expressed as a 
percentage of the total sample of 193 firms.  The p-val figure is that resulting from a test that the average coefficient value is zero.  In panel A firm-level equity and CDS 
returns are decomposed into common and idiosyncratic components based on principal components analysis.  Specifically, the first three principal components are extracted 
from the equity returns of the 193 firms.  The equity returns of each firm are then regressed on these three principal components, fitted values are saved as the common 
component of equity returns and residuals are saved as the idiosyncratic component.  A similar approach is taken for CDS returns.  These four components form the VAR.  
The relevant dependent variable is given in the first column and the explanatory variables are identified by the column headings.  In panel B a similar decomposition is 
performed for equity returns using three Fama-French factors.  CDS returns are not decomposed and the trivariate VAR is composed of the common equity return component, 
the idiosyncratic equity component and the total CDS return.  In Panel C, the equity decomposition is performed using just one factor, alternately the first principal 
component, the equally weighted average return from the 193 equities, and the Fama-French market factor.  Each row in Panel C reports the results of regression with the 
total CDS return as dependent variable.  All VAR estimates are computed using OLS with standard errors robust to unspecified heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.  The 
full sample runs from 1st January 2004 through 14th October 2008 (1208 observations per firm).   
 
 Lagged equity returns Lagged CDS returns R2 
 Common returns Idiosyncratic returns Common returns Idiosyncratic returns  
 
Coefficient 
(p-val) 
Count signif. 
(% signif.) 
Coefficient 
(p-val) 
Count signif. 
(% signif.) 
Coefficient 
(p-val) 
Count signif. 
(% signif.) 
Coefficient 
(p-val) 
Count signif. 
(% signif.) 
 
Panel A:  PCA factors         
Equity 
Common 
-0.026  
(0.632) 
0       
(0.0%) 
0.001  
(0.989) 
14     
(7.3%) 
0.027  
(0.553) 
0       
(0.0%) 
-0.001  
(0.947) 
12     
(6.2%) 0.009 
Equity 
Idiosyncratic 
0.004  
(0.954) 
30    
(15.5%) 
-0.020     
(0.677) 
31     
(16.1%) 
-0.005   
(0.896) 
20    
(10.4%) 
-0.012  
(0.603) 
22    
(11.4%) 0.017 
CDS 
Common 
-0.279  
(0.000) 
173    
(89.6%) 
-0.012  
(0.816) 
17     
(8.8%) 
0.451  
(0.000) 
193  
(100.0%) 
-0.002  
(0.947) 
30    
(15.5%) 0.293 
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CDS 
Idiosyncratic 
-0.009  
(0.922) 
19     
(9.8%) 
-0.058  
(0.459) 
28     
(14.5%) 
0.005  
(0.940) 
21    
(10.9%) 
0.078  
(0.171) 
81   
(42.0%) 0.029 
Panel B: Fama-French factors        
Equity 
Common 
-0.086  
(0.141) 
57    
(29.5%) 
0.010  
(0.787) 
15     
(7.8%) 
0.005  
(0.765) 
1       
(0.5%)   0.014 
Equity 
Idiosyncratic 
0.003  
(0.962) 
28    
(14.5%) 
-0.005  
(0.917) 
26    
(13.5%) 
-0.009  
(0.652) 
22    
(11.4%)   0.015 
CDS Total -0.422  
(0.001) 
178    
(92.2%) 
-0.086  
(0.354) 
40    
(20.7%) 
0.185  
(0.001) 
151    
(78.2%)   0.086 
Panel C:  Market factor        
Principal 
component 
#1 
-0.470  
(0.000) 
184    
(95.3%) 
-0.065  
(0.480) 
31    
(16.1%) 
0.182  
(0.002) 
150    
(77.7%)   0.089 
Average 
equity return 
-0.482  
(0.000) 
184    
(95.3%) 
-0.064  
(0.483) 
31    
(16.1%) 
0.181  
(0.002) 
149    
(77.2%)   0.090 
Fama-
French 
market 
factor 
-0.443  
(0.001) 
179    
(92.7%) 
-0.085  
(0.350) 
48    
(24.9%) 
0.184  
(0.002) 
152    
(78.8%)   0.087 
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Table 4 
Asymmetric Responses to Positive and Negative Equity Market News 
This table reports results of regressions of CDS returns on lagged equity market returns partitioned into positive 
and negative components. Lagged CDS returns are also included in the regressions. The first row of the table 
summarizes results using common components of firm CDS returns as dependent variables. The common 
components were extracted using the first three principal components of CDS returns. This row reports average 
results (coefficient values and R2 values) across the 193 individual firms together with a count of the number of 
firms with coefficients or test statistics significant at the 5% level. The latter is also expressed as a percentage of 
the total sample of 193 firms. The p-val figure is that resulting from a test that the average coefficient value is 
zero. The second row reports results from the equivalent pooled regression. The final row reports regression 
results using equally weighted portfolio CDS returns. Equity market returns are computed as the equally 
weighted equity market return for our sample of stocks. All estimates are computed using OLS with standard 
errors robust to unspecified heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. The pooled regression results report robust 
double clustered (firm and time) standard errors. The sample runs from 1st January 2004 through 14th October 
2008 (1208 observations per firm).  
 
 
 Lagged positive equity 
market returns 
Lagged negative equity 
market returns 
Coefficient 
equality test  
R2 
 Coefficient 
(p-val) 
Count 
signif. 
(% signif.) 
Coefficient 
(p-val) 
Count 
signif. 
(% signif.) 
p-val    
   (% signif.) 
 
Individual 
common 
CDS returns 
-0.497         
(0.000) 
193          
(100.0%) 
-0.159         
(0.092) 
106            
(54.9%) 
0.121 
(29.0%) 0.299 
Pooled 
regression 
-0.57 
(0.000)  
-0.34 
(0.000)  0.148 0.069 
Portfolio 
CDS 
returns 
-0.489         
(0.000)  
-0.168          
(0.058)  0.043 0.286 
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Table 5 
Cross-Sectional Variation in Responses to Good and Bad News 
The first column of this table reports results of cross-sectional regressions of estimated coefficients from row 2 of Table 4 on firm-specific variables.  Specifically, the 
dependent variable is the estimated coefficient on lagged positive equity market returns from regressions of CDS returns on lags of itself, lagged positive equity market 
returns and lagged negative equity market returns.  The second column uses the coefficient on lagged negative equity market returns from the same regression.  In the third 
column we use Difference, defined as the coefficient on positive news minus the coefficient on negative news, as a dependent variable.  All estimates are computed using 
weighted least squares with robust standard errors.  Weights are inversely proportional to the variance of the estimated coefficients from the first stage regression.  Coefficient 
estimates are reported with associated p-values in parentheses.   
 
 Positive coefficient Negative coefficient                          Difference 
Long term debt -0.0762  (0.000) -0.0093  (0.531) -0.0765  (0.009) 
Rating -0.1691  (0.015)  0.1225  (0.130) -0.2681  (0.026) 
Rating squared  0.0279  (0.005) -0.0207  (0.072)  0.0473  (0.004) 
CDS volatility -0.5398  (0.015)  0.0812  (0.207) -0.5871  (0.000) 
Equity illiquidity -8.8434  (0.015)  2.1422  (0.405) -10.9865  (0.035) 
Idiosyncratic volatility -0.0175  (0.694) -0.0839  (0.011)  0.0623  (0.345) 
Market capitalisation  0.0815  (0.001) -0.0209  (0.247)  0.1132  (0.001) 
Average CDS level -0.0004  (0.070)  0.0010  (0.004) -0.0011  (0.002) 
R2 0.345 0.089 0.268 
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Table 6 
Information Asymmetries and News Announcements 
The table reports results of regressions of CDS returns on lagged positive equity market returns interacted with 
three indicator variables.  PRE takes the value 1 on days immediately prior to important macroeconomic 
announcements (and 0 otherwise), DAY takes the value of 1 on the day of macro announcements (and 0 
otherwise) and NONE takes the value of 1 if both other indicator variables equal 0 (and 0 otherwise).  Equity 
market returns are computed as the equally weighted equity market return for our sample of stocks.  Lagged 
CDS returns and lagged negative equity market returns are also included in the regressions.  Results are reported 
for equally weighted portfolio CDS returns and for pooled individual CDS returns.  The final row reports the 
test statistic and p-value of the test that coefficients on the three interacted variables are equal.  All estimates are 
computed using OLS with standard errors robust to unspecified heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. The 
sample runs from 1st January 2004 through 14th October 2008 (1208 observations per firm). 
 
 Portfolio CDS Returns Pooled Individual CDS 
Returns 
 Coefficient (p-val) Coefficient (p-val) 
Lagged positive equity market  
returns × PRE -0.641 (0.000) -0.297 (0.000) 
Lagged positive equity market returns 
× NONE -0.437 (0.001) -0.153 (0.000) 
Lagged positive equity market returns 
× DAY -0.401 (0.032) -0.111 (0.000) 
Lagged negative equity market 
returns -0.171 (0.054) -0.159 (0.000) 
Lagged CDS returns 0.421 (0.000) 0.193 (0.000) 
R2 0.287  0.058  
Coefficient equality test 0.89 (0.410) 2.85 (0.060) 
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Table 7 
Information Asymmetries and Illiquidity 
This table reports results of a regression of equally weighted portfolio CDS returns on the variables listed in the 
first column.  The main innovation in this set of regressions is the inclusion of lagged equity market returns 
interacted with lagged average equity market bid-ask spreads.  Equity market returns are computed as the 
equally weighted equity market return for our sample of stocks.  Estimates are computed using OLS with 
standard errors robust to unspecified heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.  Coefficient estimates are reported 
with associated p-values in parentheses. The final row reports the test statistic and p-value of the test that the 
sum of the coefficients on the two interacted variables is equal to zero. The sample runs from 1st January 2004 
through 14th October 2008 (1208 observations).   
 
 Portfolio CDS Returns Pooled Individual CDS 
Returns 
 Coefficient (p-val) Coefficient (p-val) 
Lagged positive equity 
market returns -0.247 (0.044) -0.387 (0.000) 
Lagged negative equity 
market returns -0.277 (0.007) -0.477 (0.000) 
Lagged positive equity 
market returns × lagged 
spreads 
-1.244 (0.026) -0.908 (0.001) 
Lagged negative equity 
market returns × lagged 
spreads 
0.334 (0.004) 0.428 (0.000) 
Lagged CDS returns 0.420 (0.000) 0.182 (0.000) 
R2 0.290  0.070  
Coefficient equality test 5.98 (0.003) 4.99 (0.000) 
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Appendix A:  Robustness of Unconditional Equity Lead-CDS Lag Result 
 
Tables 2 in the text summarises the results of estimating VARs of equity and CDS returns.  
The dominant finding is that lagged equity returns contain information for current CDS price 
changes, while the reverse is rarely the case.  This appendix demonstrates the robustness of 
these findings. 
The VAR as specified in equations (1a) and (1b) does not control for contemporary CDS or 
equity returns, respectively.  The delayed diffusion of information from equity to CDS 
markets suggested by our results may simply be due to the omission of contemporaneous 
equity returns from equation (1b).  We test for this by incorporating the relevant 
contemporaneous return in each equation both for each reference entity individually and for 
all entities pooled together.  Results are reported in panel A of Table A2.  Our key finding - 
that CDS returns lag equity returns - is robust to the inclusion of contemporaneous equity 
returns. 
Panel B of Table A2 summarises results when we pool the companies but split the sample 
according to the credit rating and equity market capitalisation of the firms.  Irrespective of 
whether companies are rated AAA-A versus BBB-B, or whether they are in the smallest 
quartile or the middle 50% by market capitalization, lagged equity returns are significant in 
explaining current CDS returns.  Lagged equity returns are not significant in pooled 
regressions for firms in the largest quartile but this is driven by a small number of firms since 
lagged equity returns are significant for the largest quintile (coefficient = -0.29, p-val = 
0.000).  Conversely, but irrespective of how we separate the firms, lagged CDS returns are 
not significant in the equity returns regressions, with the sole exception of the small firms.  
Even in this case, however, the magnitude of the coefficient is very small and the goodness of 
fit very low indicating statistical but not economic significance. 
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Panel C of Table A2 pools the companies but splits the sample into pre-crisis and crisis 
periods.  The pre-crisis period runs from the start of the sample through the end of June 2007 
while the crisis period runs from the start of August 2007 to the end of the sample period.  
Observations for July 2007 are dropped from the analysis. Again, there is a strong lag of the 
CDS market in both periods. It is interesting to note that the CDS predictability is higher in 
the crisis period (the coefficient on lagged equity returns is -0.349, compared to -0.226 before 
the crisis). There is some evidence of information in lagged CDS returns for the equity 
market prior to the crisis, but this is again statistically but not economically significant and, 
further, completely disappears during the crisis interval. 
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Table A2 
Bivariate VAR Results 
The table reports the results of a bivariate vector autoregression of daily equity and CDS returns with one lag.  
The relevant dependent variable is given in the first column of each row.  The first two rows report average 
results (coefficient values and R2 values) across the 193 individual firms together with a count of the number of 
firms with coefficients significant at the 5% level.  The latter is also expressed as a percentage of the total 
sample of 193 firms.  The p-val figure is that resulting from a test that the average coefficient value is zero.  The 
remaining rows report pooled regression results.  OLS results use standard errors robust to unspecified 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.  Pooled regressions report p-values based on standard errors robust to 
unspecified heteroscedasticity and double clustered by day and by firm.  The full sample runs from 1st January 
2004 through 14th October 2008 (1208 observations per firm).  In panel A the equity (CDS) equation in the 
VAR is augmented with contemporaneous CDS (equity) returns.  In panel C, the pre-crisis period runs from 1st 
January 2004 through end June 2007 (877 observations per firm) and the crisis period runs from start August 
2007 to the end of the sample (308 observations per firm). 
 
 Lagged equity returns Lagged CDS returns R2 
 
Coefficient 
(p-val) 
Count 
significant 
(% signif.) 
Coefficient 
(p-val) 
Count 
significant 
(% signif.) 
 
Panel A:      
Individual firms with contemporaneous 'other asset' returns  
Equity returns -0.051 (0.392) 
43 
(22.3%) 
0.029 
(0.424) 
47 
(24.4%) 0.054 
CDS returns -0.208 (0.023) 
154 
(79.8%) 
0.196 
(0.001) 
157 
(81.3%) 0.118 
Pooled firms with contemporaneous 'other asset' returns   
Equity returns 0.000 (0.998)  
0.018 
(0.161)  0.036 
CDS returns -0.160 (0.000)  
0.190 
(0.000)  0.091 
Panel B:      
Credit rating      
AAA-A      
Equity returns 0.002   (0.946)  
-0.003  
(0.829)  0.000 
CDS returns -0.240  (0.000)  
0.150   
(0.000)  0.050 
BBB-B      
Equity returns -0.008  (0.677)  
-0.004  
(0.785)  0.000 
CDS returns -0.162  (0.000)  
0.228   
(0.000)  0.077 
Size      
Largest 25%      
Equity returns 0.111   (0.398)  
-0.014   
(0.587)  0.014 
CDS returns -0.140   (0.193)  
0.158   
(0.000)  0.037 
Middle 50%      
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Equity returns -0.015   (0.510)  
-0.000   
(0.974)  0.002 
CDS returns -0.189   (0.000)  
0.200   
(0.000)  0.064 
Smallest 25%     
Equity returns 0.002   (0.885)  
-0.014   
(0.263)  0.003 
CDS returns -0.150   (0.000)  
0.222   
(0.000)  0.077 
Panel C:      
Pre-crisis     
Equity returns 0.006   (0.590)  
-0.004  
(0.388)  0.000 
CDS returns -0.147  (0.000)  
0.166   
(0.000)  0.037 
Crisis period     
Equity returns 0.027   (0.573)  
-0.005  
(0.837)  0.001 
CDS returns -0.166  (0.002)  
0.210   
(0.000)  0.075 
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Appendix B: List of Firms Analysed 
Basic Materials Liz Claiborne Tjx Cos. Wyeth Kinder Morgan En.Ptns. 
Alcoa Newell Rubbermaid Walt Disney  Marathon Oil 
Ashland Pepsico Yum! Brands Industrials Parker Drilling 
Commercial Mtls. Pulte Homes  3m Pioneer Ntrl.Res. 
Cytec Inds. Sara Lee Financials Arrow Electronics Sunoco 
Dow Chemical Sears Holdings Allstate Avnet  
E I Du Pont De Nemours Smithfield Foods Ambac Financial Boeing Technology 
Eastman Chemical Stanley Works American Express Burl.Nthn.Santa Fe  Amkor Tech. 
Intl. Paper Standard Pacific AIG Caterpillar CA 
Monsanto Toll Bros. Aon CSX Centurytel 
Newmont Mining Tyson Foods Berkshire Hathaway Danaher Computer Scis. 
Nucor Universal Capital One Finl. Dover Corning 
Olin V F Chubb Emerson Electric Dell 
Praxair Whirlpool Cit Group Fedex Hewlett-Packard 
Weyerhaeuser  CNA Financial Goodrich IBM 
 Consumer Services General Electric Honeywell Intl. Motorola 
Consumer Goods Autozone Goldman Sachs Gp. Lockheed Martin Pitney-Bowes 
Altria Group Cardinal Health Hartford Finl.Svs.Gp. Masco Sun Microsystems 
Archer-Danls.-Midl. Comcast Lincoln Nat. Meadwestvaco Texas Insts. 
Arvinmeritor Costco Wholesale Loews Norfolk Southern Xerox 
Avon Products Dillards Marsh & Mclennan Raytheon 'B'  
Black & Decker Gannett Mbia Republic Svs. Utilities 
Borgwarner Home Depot Metlife Ryder System Cms Energy 
Brunswick Interpublic Gp. Mgic Investment Sealed Air Constellation En. 
Campbell Soup Penney Jc Morgan Stanley Sherwin-Williams Dte Energy 
Centex Kohl's PMJ Group Temple Inland Duke Energy 
Coca Cola Kroger Prudential Finl. Textron Entergy 
Coca Cola Ents. Limited Brands Radian Gp. Union Pacific Exelon 
Conagra Foods Lowe's Companies SLM United Parcel Ser. Oneok 
Constellation Brands Marriott Intl. Washington Mutual Waste Man. Pepco Holdings 
Cooper Tire & Rub. McDonalds Wells Fargo & Co  Progress Energy 
D R Horton McKesson  Oil & Gas Sempra En. 
Ford Motor Nordstrom Health Care Anadarko Petroleum Teco Energy 
Fortune Brands Office Depot Abbott Laboratories Apache Xcel Energy 
General Mills Omnicom Gp. Amgen Baker Hughes  
General Motors Radioshack Boston Scientific Chesapeake Energy  
Johnson Controls Safeway Bristol Myers Squibb Chevron  
Jones Apparel Group Southwest Airlines Humana Conocophillips  
KB Home Staples Medtronic Devon Energy  
Kellogg Starwood Htls.& Rsts. Merck & Co. Diamond Offs.Drl.  
Kimberly-Clark Supervalu Pfizer El Paso  
Kraft Foods Target Schering-Plough Enterprise Prds.Ptns.Lp. 
Lear Gap Tenet Hlthcr. Forest Oil  
Lennar Time Warner Unitedhealth Gp. Hess 
 
